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In most application scenarios for Peer-to-Peer systems, in order to achieve an overall acceptable system performance an
incentive scheme is required that motivates users to share as much as possible of their free resources Today most peers use
connections of asymmetric links, such as A-DSL or cable modems. Therefore, users have significantly more download
bandwidth than their available upload bandwidth. Applying this observation to incentive schemes suggests that one unit of
upload bandwidth should be valued higher than one download unit. Using such an incentive scheme leads the economy of the
system to inflation. The incentive scheme would finally collapse. However, by exhibiting the phenomenon of altruistic
behavior altruistic peers would accumulate the waste amount of the incentive units. Thus, inflation might be avoided.
Gathering the results of a detailed simulative approach, this paper shows how to balance asymmetric incentive schemes in
order to avoid inflation.
Keywords
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INTRODUCTION
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems are based on the assumption that participating peers share their own resources with other peers
while they benefit from resources that are shared by others. Through resource replication and utilization of otherwise unused
resources, P2P systems can provide much higher robustness and performance at lower costs than traditional client/server-
based applications. Emerging P2P file sharing systems like KaZaA and eDonkey host huge amount of content in a reliable
way. However, as users have no incentives to share their own resources, there are many free-riders only benefiting from the
system and never giving anything back. In consequence, few peers provide most of the content. In the absence of
economically efficient mechanisms, which balance the utilization and provisioning of resources, these systems operate with a
considerably reduced performance and below the social optimum [13]. In contrast to the centralized solutions, the
mechanisms required for P2P systems are much more complicated to be implemented and misusage is difficult to prevent.
Today, multiple incentive mechanisms have been presented, e.g. [17, 19, 23]. However, in [13] is was shown that in P2P file
sharing some free-riding can be tolerated in the social optimum, which is not addressed by the proposed incentive
mechanisms. A weaker incentive mechanism would be appropriate where peers would not be required to provide as much
resources as they consume. However, it is a matter of fairness that every peer should still contribute some amount of
resources to the system and complete free-riding is not permitted. Further, none of the presented incentive mechanisms
addresses the fact that most of today’s Internet connections are asymmetric. For example in Europe, a standard DSL-
connection has a download bandwidth of 1024 kbit/s and an upload bandwidth of only 128 kbit/s. Therefore, in order to incite
users to share resources providing upload bandwidth should be valued higher than using download bandwidth. Indeed, most
of the known P2P incentive mechanisms do not allow such asymmetric incentives. The token-based accounting system [14]
is flexible enough for this purpose. It uses tokens as a mean of virtual currency and allows to reward users for uploads with
payback tokens. In this paper, it is used to study the effects of asymmetric incentives. However, there is one major concern if
uploads are valued higher than downloads. Since the transferred amount of data is symmetric - the same amount of data is
uploaded as it is downloaded - with every provided service more virtual currency is created. This will lead to inflation and
will finally result in a collapse of the incentive system. Due to the P2P paradigm, there is no central currency broker in the
token-based accounting system that could control the virtual currency supply. Therefore, another mechanism must be found.
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A mechanism that calculates the amount of currency in the system would need to get trustworthy information from each peer
about its current amount of virtual currency it own. This introduces an enormous overhead. Therefore, we are looking for a
different way to cope with inflation.
In this paper, we want to capitalize altruistic peer behavior to overcome the inflation effect. Altruistic peers would
accumulate the additional created tokens and consequently the system may stay in a steady state. This paper shows to which
extend altruistic behavior can balance the inflation effect of asymmetric incentives. Simulations are used to analyze different
scenarios with different proportions of altruistic peers in the P2P system. Accordingly, the remaining sections of this paper
are structured as follows: In the next section, we present the work related to incentive systems. Then we will give a short
overview of the token-based accounting system. In Section 4, the simulation model is presented and in Section 5 the
simulation results are discussed. Section 6 concludes this paper.
RELATED WORK
Without a working incentive system, P2P systems are threatened to be exploited by free-riders. Measurements about the free-
rider problem are published e.g. in [2, 21, 22]. Incentive systems to counter these effects are proposed in several approaches:
In [10] a game theoretic approach is presented. In [9] a distributed algorithmic mechanism is suggested. A system with soft
incentives for P2P systems (unlike hard incentives as e.g. money) is presented in [1]. The P2P file sharing application
MojoNation [15, 16] used a micro payment system to give flexible incentives to users. Fairness in P2P systems is examined
in [18]. Further incentive mechanisms are e.g. [17, 19, 23]. A flexible, token-based accounting system that can be used also
as an incentive system is presented in [14]. It is used for the analysis presented in this paper. The basics of the token-based
accounting system are explained in the following section.
TOKEN-BASED ACCOUNTING SYSTEM
The token based accounting system assumes that users can uniquely be identified through a permanent id, e.g. through a
private/public key pair proven through a certificate issued from a certification authority like regulated by [8]. Depending on
the application scenario, alternative approaches like [6] are also applicable. Apart from a certificate authority, it is intended to
avoid any central element. To implement security, RSA threshold cryptography is applied [10]. RSA based shared keys can
be created and updated in a decentralized way [3], [12].
Each peer holds an account with a specific amount of tokens clearly issued to it. A peer spends a token by sending it to its
transaction partner in order to receive a service. Accordingly, when a peer provides a service it collects tokens from other
peers. Peers cannot spend tokens issued to other peers (the so-called “foreign tokens”). Using the token aggregation process
peers exchange the collected foreign tokens against new ones issued to it.
Tokens are issued to a specific peer by including the owner peer’s id. Further, tokens contain a unique identifier and are
signed with the peer-to-peer system’s private key. Since a central element for token creation or token signing does not exist,
token creation and signing is distributed among peers of the system. The system’s private key is shared among the super-
peers of the system. A quorum of super-peers is able to sign new tokens (partially) with the system’s private key using
threshold cryptography [7]. The token-based accounting system consists of the three basic protocols: Token Aggregation,
Check for Double Spending, and Payment (see Figure 1 to 3).
Token Aggregation
The Token Aggregation process is used to exchange tokens a peer collected against new tokens. Since the basic purpose of
this system is accounting and no central authority is used to issue the tokens, they should be traceable to enable control.
Therefore, mechanisms to provide anonymity known from electronic cash are not applicable to this scenario [4, 5].
The Token Aggregation procedure is shown in Figure 1. Peers send N collected tokens (Fn1, ..., FnN) to a super-peer that
checks the tokens for validity and calculates the amount M of new tokens the peer shall receive in return based on the
aggregation function A(Fn1, ..., FnN). The aggregation function is public and can take any form. The super-peer creates M
new, unsigned tokens (Un1, ..., UnM) and gets them signed with the shared private key by a quorum of super-peers using RSA
threshold schemes [10]. The partial tokens (Pn1, ..., PnM) are transmitted to the owner and are combined to new complete
tokens Tn1, ..., TnM.
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Figure 1. Token Aggregation Protocol Figure 2. Double Spending
Detection
Figure 3. Payment Protocol
Check for Double Spending
As described in the prerequisites, we assume that every peer owns a private/public key pair that uniquely identifies the peer.
Before sending a token, a peer adds the required accounting information to the token and signs it using its private key. Only
tokens that are signed by the owner-peer are valid for aggregation. The receiving peer only accepts valid tokens with correct
accounting information. Otherwise, it stops the service. A token is valid if it is signed with the shared private key and has not
been spent before. To check for double spending, a token must uniquely be identifiable. The token id consists of the token
owner id, the issuing date and time, and a sequence number.
The double spending mechanism requires for each peer an additional account on a remote peer. For efficiency reasons, the
account-holding peers are organized using a DHT-based overlay structure based on Pastry [20]. The remote account contains
a list of tokens issued to the account owner. The list of the ids of the issued tokens is sent to the account-holding peer during
the Token Aggregation phase. Prior to each transaction, the customer peer notifies the providing peer which tokens it intends
to spend within the transaction. The providing peer asks the account-holder whether these tokens are valid. In the token list,
during this step valid tokens are marked as spent and finally removed from the list when exchanged in an aggregation
process. This way double spending cannot only be detected and traced to the source but it also can be avoided (see Figure 2).
Payment
The accounting system supports the following trustworthy way for the exchange of content and tokens. Tokens are sent in
two parts. Before the service is provided, a token is sent without the owner’s (customer peer’s) signature. Now the provider
peer provides the service. Finally the customer peer fills into the token the required accounting information, signs the token
and sends it over to the provider . If the customer peer fails to deliver the final part of the token, the providing peer cannot
use the incomplete token for token aggregation. However, the token will be marked as spent. Both peers lose their incentive
to cheat. A reputation system will provide further incentives against malicious behavior.
For more details about the token-based accounting system we refer to [14].
SIMULATION MODEL
The goal of the simulation model is to determine if in a P2P file sharing scenario asymmetric incentives make sense. Thus, an
asymmetric incentive system must fulfill two criteria. On the one hand, no inflation must occur when asymmetric incentives
are used in order to ensure that the incentive scheme is stable over time and its effects are not diminished. On the other hand,
it must be shown that the asymmetric incentive mechanism is functioning, i.e. it has an affect on user behavior.
To implement asymmetric incentives into the P2P system we use the token-based accounting system by choosing an
aggregation function different than
,FN = tokensforeignexchangedofamountFtokensnewofamountNwhere == ,
To value an upload twice as high as an download the aggregation function would be set to FN 2= .
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To assess if inflation occurs in the system we have to define a condition to determine which tokens are still used for trading
in the system and which not. I.e., we have to determine which tokens belong to the cash flow in the system.
To assess whether the incentive system is still functional we have to determine if peers’ file sharing behavior is improved in
comparison to peers’ file sharing behavior without incentive system. In order to accomplish that we have to define peer
behavior models for strategic peers and for altruistic peers.
Peer behavior models
To model realistic peer behavior, three different file sharing behavior models are used. Each peer belongs to one of the
following peer classes:
• Strategic peers that do not share any files voluntarily. They represent free-riders.
• Normal peers that merely share a small number of files. They correspond to peers that download files and share
them afterwards for some time.
• Altruistic peers that share all files they have.
In our model, we assume that peers upload all files that requested from them. Therefore, in our model the goal of an incentive
system is to motivate normal peers and strategic peers to share more files.
Inflation detection
To determine whether inflation occurs in the system, the amount of tokens available to the peers targeted by incentive system
must be calculated. If this number increases over time then inflation of tokens occurs. Typically, the peers targeted by the
incentive systems are the strategic peers and the normal peers. Altruistic peers share their files independently of the presence
of an incentive system. Therefore, altruistic peers are expected to accumulate tokens. These accumulated tokens are not
available to the system anymore. In order to decide which tokens are still available to the system we defined that the tokens
available to the systems are represented by the own tokens in the system. Further, we defined that the tokens not available to
the system are represented by the foreign tokens in the system. Thus, in the simulation peers exchange received foreign
tokens immediately back to own tokens, and plan to spend them again. Accordingly, in the simulation foreign tokens
represent the tokens that are not available in the system anymore. Therefore, for every behavior model a different exchange
policy must be defined:
• Strategic peers exchange all received foreign tokens immediately back to own tokens.
• Normal peers target to have always available a specific amount of own tokens.
• Altruistic peers also want to download from the P2P system. Therefore, they also try to have a specific amount of
own tokens available.
By applying these rules for file sharing and inflation detection, it can be argued that strategic peers do not accumulate any
tokens. They merely spend tokens for downloading files. However, they only receive tokens when they share files (what they
normally  do  not  do).  On the  other  hand,  altruistic  peers  will  accumulate  tokens,  while  normal  peers  always  share  a  small
number of files. The purpose of the incentive system is to motivate all peers to share more files. Therefore, normal peers
could also accumulate tokens. However, that would mean the incentive system is not working for the normal peers anymore.
Accordingly, the amount of foreign tokens normal peers hold is a measure for the degree of inflation in the P2P system.
Further, a metric for the efficiency of the incentive mechanism is needed. The purpose of the incentive system is to motivate
peers to share more files. Accordingly, the amount of additional files normal share and the amount of files foreign peers share
is the measure of the efficiency of the incentive mechanism.
To evaluate the described peer behavior model a simulator was used that will be now described in detail.
Simulator
The simulator implemented for this paper is round-based. At the beginning of every round, each peer has a specific number
of own tokens T and foreign tokens F and shares a specific number of files f.  In addition, each peer belongs to one of the
three behavior classes. In this work we want to assess for which percentages of altruistic and strategic peers asymmetric
incentives can be applied. Accordingly, the behavior class is invariable for each peer. During each simulation round for each
peer it is determined whether it wants to download a file based on a predefined download probability. If so, it is determined
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which  file  the  peer  wants  to  download  as  well  as  the  provider  peer.  Each  file  has  a  specific  price p in tokens. In this
simulation the focus is on the inflation of the system not on file distribution. If we assume that according to their popularity
files are evenly distributed among the behavior classes and that the interest in these files is also evenly distributed among the
behavior classes, we can conclude, that file popularity does not influence the inflation effect. Therefore, file popularity is not
modeled.  A download takes place if the requestor peer has enough own token to pay the provider. Then the provider receives
an amount of foreign tokens that is equal to the file price p.  The  same  amount  of  own  tokens  is  subtracted  from  the
customer’s  own  tokens.  If  the  customer  does  not  have  enough  own  tokens  to  afford  the  download,  the  peer  shares  an
additional amount of file f’ in order to receive more upload requests. In the next round, the peer will try again to download
the file. If it  still  does not have enough own tokens, it  will  again share some more files. This continues until  the download
request is successful. At the end of each round, peers’ foreign tokens are exchanged against own tokens according to the
peer’s behavior class’ exchange policy. In addition, the amount of shared files is adjusted. If a peer downloaded a file
successfully, the file sharing policy according to the behavior model is applied. Otherwise, the peer will share additional files,
as described before. Finally, for each peer class the amount of tokens and shared files is calculated for evaluation purposes.
Peer up-time is not modeled in the simulation. If we assume that peers show the same up-time behavior in all behavior
classes, then on average the percentages of peers of the behavior classes in the system are invariable. Accordingly, peer up-
time will not have an influence on the inflation effect.
Simulation scenarios
In every simulated scenario, peers start with 25 own tokens and no foreign tokens. Each peer starts with a certain number of
own files; this number is uniformly distributed between 5 and 100. The files have a normal distributed price with a mean of 5
and a standard deviation of 3. Altruistic peers share all of their files. Normal peers share a random number of files, which has
a  Normal  distribution  with  a  mean of  10  and a  standard  deviation  of  5.  Peers  want  to  download a  single  random file  in  a
simulation round with a probability of 25%. Altruistic and normal peers exchange 15 foreign tokens to own tokens as soon as
their balance of own tokens falls below 20. For the presented results, systems with 1000 peers have been simulated with
varying ratios of altruistic, normal, and strategic peers.  In empirically observed file sharing systems, there are approximately
10% to 20% altruistic peers according to [2, 11]. Strategically acting peers form the majority. The parameters of the
simulated scenarios are provided in Table 1.
Behavior Classes Exchange Function
Altruistic Normal Strategic Upload Download Comments
10% 30% 60% - - No incentive system for comparison
10% 30% 60% 1 1 Symmetric incentives for comparison
10% 30% 60% 1,5 1
10% 30% 60% 2 1
10% 30% 60% 3 1
10% 30% 60% 1 2 Valuing downloads higher than
uploads to force more uploads
20% 30% 50% - - No incentive system for comparison
20% 30% 50% 1 1 Symmetric incentives for comparison
20% 30% 50% 1,5 1
20% 30% 50% 2 1
20% 30% 50% 3 1
Table 1. Conducted Simulations
RESULTS
Figure  4  shows the  inflation  in  a  P2P system with  60% strategic  peers  and only  10% altruistic  peers.  Inflation  occurs  for
exchange functions 2:1 (uploads are valued twice as high as downloads) and 3:1. For an exchange rate of 1,5:1 the system
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stabilizes at approximately 4,5 foreign tokens per peer on average. The amount of own tokens for normal peers stabilizes at
approximately 16 tokens (as expected due to the exchange rules). For symmetric incentives (exchange function 1:1), normal
peers have 5 foreign tokens on average. A scenario where downloads are valued higher than uploads to encourage peers
much  stronger  to  share  files  also  has  been  also  investigated.  However,  this  reduces  the  amount  of  tokens  in  the  system
leading very soon to a situation where no tokens are left in the system and no sharing is possible anymore. Such scenarios do
not make sense.
Figure 5 shows the inflation in a P2P system with 50% strategic peers and only 20% altruistic peers. In comparison to the
scenarios with 10% altruistic peers, the inflation is slightly reduced. Also here with an exchange function of 1,5:1 the system
stabilizes.
Figure 6 shows the development of sharing files of the normal peers. For an incentive free scenario, a normal peer shares on
average 7 files (labeled “no” in Figure 6). For the scenario with symmetric incentives, a normal peer shares initially 7 files
and after 1000 simulation rounds 246 files. These two scenarios form the lower and the upper bounds for asymmetric
incentive scenarios. The scenarios 2:1 and 3:1 perform better than the scenario without incentives. However, the amount of
files normal peers share is reduced by approximately 65% in comparison to the symmetric incentives scenario. The stable
asymmetric scenario (exchange function 1,5:1) performs as good as the symmetric scenario. Similar observations can be
made for a 20% proportion of altruistic peers as Figure 7 shows.
Figure 8 shows the development of sharing files of the strategic peers. Here, similar results as for the file sharing of normal
peers can be observed. Figure 9 shows again only slight differences when the proportion of altruistic peers in the system

































Figure 4. Normal peers' foreign tokens (average per peer) for
60% strategic peers
Figure 5. Normal peers' foreign tokens (average per peer) for
50% strategic peers
According to these observations, it can be concluded that altruistic peers can compensate the inflation effect if the ratio for
asymmetric incentives is more than 2:1. In addition, it can be seen that even for higher asymmetric incentive ratios the
incentive mechanism still has a positive effect on peers file sharing behavior. The incentive mechanism still accomplishes its
purpose.
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Figure 6. Normal peers’ shared files (average per peer) for 60%
strategic peers

































Figure 8. Strategic peers’ shared files (average per peer) for 60%
strategic peers
Figure 9. Strategic peers’ shared files (average per peer) for
50% strategic peers
CONCLUSIONS
P2P systems are based on the assumption that participating peers share their own resources with other peers. However, file
sharing applications have shown that only a minority of peers share their resources voluntarily. This reduces the system
performance considerably and the system operates below the social optimum [13]. Therefore, incentive schemes are needed.
They motivate or even force users to share more resources. However, at the social optimum free-riding can be tolerated to a
specific degree. Therefore, an incentive scheme does not need to be strict, i.e. not all peers need to provide at least as many
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resources as they consume. However, as a matter of fairness every peer should still contribute some amount of resources to
the system and complete free-riding should not be permitted. Further, today’s Internet connections are in their majority
asymmetric. Thus, the rationale to introduce asymmetric incentives to allow a specific degree of free-riding and to value an
upload higher than a download is obvious. However, inflation of the virtual currency used to introduce incentives might
occur. Due to the P2P paradigm there is no central broker in the system that could control the virtual currency supply.
Altruistic peers that accumulate the surplus currency counteract the inflation effect. This paper showed how to configure
asymmetric incentives in order to compensate the inflation effect.
The key finding of the conducted simulation is that the inflation effect for asymmetric incentives with ratios of 2:1 and higher
can not be compensated by realistic proportions of altruistic peers. However, it was shown for asymmetric incentive ratios
below 2:1 (and above 1:1), the inflation effect is compensated and the system evolves to a steady state. This is true for all
different percentages of altruistic peers we simulated. Thus, here altruistic peers seem to offer a natural way to cope with
inflation. With different percentages of altruistic peers (and incentive ratios below 2:1) the system evolves at a steady state
because the resulting sharing behavior of the strategic peers differs. Further, it was shown that even with higher asymmetric
incentive ratios than 2:1, peers show considerably improved file sharing behavior, which fulfills the main goal of an incentive
system.
Further research steps are to find the exact ratios of asymmetric incentive systems where inflation starts to occur. In addition,
asymmetric incentive ratios that lead to inflation have to be investigated more deeply. It is interesting to explore whether in
the long term the (initially) improved file sharing behavior might degrade again. Further, it is interesting to explore how the
distribution of popular files in influenced by different asymmetric incentives.
This work has been performed partially in context of the project “Preis- und Erlösmodelle im Internet - Umsetzung und Marktchancen” (Premium), where
the TU Darmstadt has been funded by the German Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung BMBF.
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